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This is an intriguing book, partly because of its content, partly because ofits complex form
and style. It is presented as tracing "the origins in the first half of the nineteenth century of
certain anatomical and physiological concepts that have proved fundamental in the human
neurosciences." By 1850, it isclaimed, Galenic and Hallerian concepts had been overthrown and
the foundations of modern neuroscience had been laid. Such formulations suggest a book
organized around modern notions, and so, in part, it is. They suggest, also, that traditional
"contribution" histories of neuroanatomy and neurophysiology will be updated from recent
historical literature, and rendered more critical and contextual; indeed, whole sections of the
work are of this useful if unexciting kind. But the book as a whole does not fit this pattern.
Medical readers will wonder why generally it stops around 1850, when many of the concepts
under review were scarcely secure or even formed; historians will be pleased that among much
technical detail there are important general arguments about conceptual development and the
role ofromanticism. The two goals ofthis book the exploration ofconceptual roots, and the
exploration of a period-are not easily reconciled. Let us deal first with the "roots".
The six main chapters ofthe book are entitled 'The cerebrospinal axis', 'The nerve cell', 'The
reflex', 'Nerve function', 'Brain functions' and 'The vegetative nervous system'. The first is
concerned with the shift away from a "top down" view ofthe central nervous system, in which
the spinal cord was but an extension ofa more or less unitary brain. In the new view, the system
was a federation ofunits, ganglia forexample. Thishistoriographical focus is novel and specific;
the chapter carries a strong explanatory argument. A similar argument is explored in the next
chapter: the brain had been a 'pulpy mass', but it became a collection of nerve cells and nerve
fibres, though the relations between the two were still much disputed at mid-century. Here the
account focuses on Purkyne and Valentin and their philosophy ofnature. 'The reflex' is a more
familiar historical subject, if only because of the attention that has already been given to the
British actors, especially Bell and Marshall Hall; here the treatment ofthe latter is particularly
full. More novel is the discussion of 'cerebral reflexes', which draws on German sources, and
again stresses the importance ofcomparative and genetic perspectives.
The chapter 'Nerve function' is largely concerned with the role of 'animal electricity'. Here,
uniquely, the story is largely Italian: from Galvani and Volta to thework ofMatteucci. It isgood
to have an accessible account ofthe latter, and here aselsewhere the authors have been generous
in discussing and quoting the receptions of the views explored. In this way, they offer a much
fuller guide to the period than could be obtained from most accounts of conceptual
developments. But here, too, the problem of chronology becomes evident. Important though
Matteucci was, he can hardly be considered to have established "the foundation ofthe modern
view". The work ofthe German school, ofdu Bois-Reymond and Hermann, is only sketched.
A similar problem arises with 'Brain functions', interpreted ascerebral localization. There is a
good discussion ofGall (who got it right, sort of), and an excellent treatment ofFlourens, who
got it wrongsowell asto hold localization back until the 1870s. In the lastchapter, the focus is on
Bichat and the concept of a vegetative nervous system, functionally separate from the animal
nervous system. This whole subject is so complicated that "right" and "wrong" become even
more difficult to apply. It is clear that by 1850 no one was clear about the autonomic.
Even where it is "presentist", this book hasmany virtues, not least thewide range ofreferences
and the full bibliography. The introduction contains a useful survey of the approaches which
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investigators have used in studying the nervous system which includes notes on the difficulties
encountered. It is helpful forhistorians to be reminded that to understand the results ofFlourens
we need to know not only about the peculiarities ofhis "brain", but about those ofpigeons too.
But it would in any case be unfair to brand this whole work as simply presentist. The
arrangement, and parts ofthe text, rely on "modern views" but within this frame the treatment
ofearly nineteenth-century "neuro-science" is catholic, wide and very well-referenced. And as I
have indicated, there are sections which are novel, imaginative and fully contextual.
It is in these sections that the authors claim their major contribution to historiography: that
"changes in ideas of the function and structure of the nervous system during this period were
stimulated by the romantic philosophy ofnature that exerted a major influence upon biological
thought inthe firsthalfofthenineteenthcentury."Theclaim isnot thatardent Naturphilosophen
were crucial, but that the principles of the approach were widespread and influential. These
general princip]Ls could be found in the programmes of Timothy Lenoir's (Kantian) vital
materialists and they persisted in the work ofex-romantics like Griesinger (see p.134); they were
found in the work of French transcendentalists like Geoffroy Saint Hilaire, and in that ofsuch
British (comparative) physiologists as Carpenter. Jacyna has already published important work
on British cell-theory and on neurophysiology, in which he explored this theme. Here the
argument is expanded to cover nerve cells, ganglia and cerebral reflexes.
As the authors recognize, there is scope for much more investigation, and indeed for
presentations in a form rather different from the present one. This book was not the place to
attempt a closer analysis of the "romantic" arguments, or the possible sources of these ideas
outside Naturphilosophie. But this needs doing: some ofthe methodological principles involved
were very important. It has, for example, been far too easy to assume that 'comparative
physiology', especially argumentsfrom lower animals, was a product ofevolutionary thought.
This is obviously wrong. Here, as in morphology, Darwinism gave a new kind ofexplanation for
resemblances already well-explored by biologists searching for common principles, rather than
common ancestors.
This first became clear to mewhen I wastrying toexplain how'absorption'-which in the late
eighteenth century had been a property of a special system (the lymphatics)-had become, by
1830, a general property ofliving tissues. One answer was an argument employed in France by
Blainville and his disciples:
It is an incontestable principle that what is observed in the lowest animals, in which animality is, so to
speak, reduced to its most simple expression, must recur in the higher animals.I
It is this principle, chiefly, which Clarke and Jacyna see at work in the new "from below" view
of the cerebrospinal axis, and ofcerebral reflexes. In a recent article, Sir Andrew Huxley has
shown how the same principle led investigators ofmuscle contraction to ignorecross-striations;
thesewere found onlyin higheranimals(and thereonly in'voluntary' muscles), sothey could not
be fundamental.2
As these examples show, this was a heuristic principle which could be very misleading; but it
was close to the heart of a revolution in the conceptualization of the body. "Classical bodies"
were seen as wholes, and man was the reference point. By the 1830s, bodies were being
understood "bottom up", from their parts, and simpler animals were a major clue to the nature
ofthese parts. Theexplanation ofthatcomplex (Copernican?) shift is, to my mind, amajor issue
for historians. It will require careful unpicking of the principles involved, and of their
articulation in the various national contexts.
To this general endeavour the present book, though hardly designed for this task, makes a
majorcontribution. There is much on German, French and British biology to benefit historians
of science and medicine. Those in search of the "origins of neuroscientific concepts" will find
some and miss others; they will discover that "origins" have to be read in context; that concepts
familiar in today's laboratories may descend, in fact, from quite a "foreign country", where
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"neuroscience" was done very differently. It is a lesson Canguilhem taught for the early history
ofreflexes;3 butonethatfewhavelearned. Hereitispresentedagain,moreoverbackedbysucha
wealth of detail as to constitute, also, a major work of reference.
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